

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 01607 060754Z  
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DEAE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 IO-13  
JUSE-00 NSAE-00 CTME-00 SNM-05 TRSE-00 ICA-11  
NSC-05 OES-07 OMB-01 /064 W  
-----081898 061052Z /13

R 060545Z JUN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO  
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY KARACHI  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
DEA HQS WASHDC  
SECSTATE WASHDC 7945

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PASS DEA FOR ASAIC

DEA HQS FOR ENON/COOK AND ENOF/SAO/SEA

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: SNAR  
SUBJECT: GFXA-75-8043 MODUS OPERANDI (SEA HEROIN SMUGGLING ROUTE  
CHANGES.

REF: A) THE HAGUE 2928, B) TEHRAN 5196  
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1. THERE ARE PRESENTLY FOUR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS IN THE UNITED  
ARAB  
EMIRATES: ABU DHABI, DUBAI, SHARJAH, AND RAS AL KHAIMAH (RAK). FIRST  
TWO HAVE A HIGH VOLUME OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC BETWEEN EUROPE, SOUTH  
ASIA, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. SHARJAH AND RAK HAVE REGULARLY SCHEDULED  
FLIGHTS TO EUROPE AND OTHER GULF/MIDEAST CITIES BUT VIRTUALLY NONE TO

OR FROM SOA/SEA. (RAK HAS ONE FLIGHT WEEKLY FROM KARACHI AND ONE FROM BOMBAY; SHARJAH HAS NONE FROM KARACHI, THREE WEEKLY FROM BOMBAY.) CONTRARY SUGGESTION CONTAINED REF B, WE DO NOT SEE SHARJAH OR RAK AT PRESENT TIME AS PLAUSIBLE COURIER TRANSFER POINTS IN MANNER REPORTED REF A.

2. THIS LEAVES ABU DHABI AND DUBAI. BOTH AIRPORTS ARE SERVED BY DIRECTOR  
FLIGHTS FROM CITIES NAMED PARA 4 REF A, AS FOLLOWS:

A. COLOMBO - ABU DHABI: NIL  
COLOMBO - DUBAI: BRITISH AIRWAYS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES

B. DACCA - ABU DHABI: BANGLADESH BIMAN  
DACCA - DUBAI: BANGLADESH BIMAN

C. JAKARTA - ABU DHABI: SABENA  
JAKARTA - DUBAI: NONE DIRECT

D. KUALA LUMPUR - ABU DHABI: SABENA  
KUALA LUMPUR - DUBAI: SABENA, BRITISH AIRWAYS

E. SINGAPORE - ABU DHABI: SABENA  
SINGAPORE - DUBAI: KLM, SABENA, SINGAPORE AIRLINES

F. KARACHI - ABU DHABI: GULFAIR, KUWAITI, SYRIAN, ROYAL JORDANIAN,  
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PIA,  
SOMALI  
KARACHI - DUBAI: PIA, KUWAITI, EGYPTAIR, GULFAIR, SYRIAN, IRAQI,  
ROYAL JORDANIAN

IN ADDITION, KARACHI AS WELL AS BOMBAY IS CONNECTING POINT FROM WHICH PASSENGERS IN TRANSIT FROM SEA POINTS MAY GET ONWARD FLIGHTS TO UAE DESTINATIONS.

3. BOTH ABU DHABI AND DUBAI OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONTACT IN TRANSIT WITH COURIERS ARRIVING OR DEPARTING VIA FLIGHTS FROM/TO EUROPE

EMBASSY HAS NEITHER MANPOWER NOR COMPUTER CAPABILITY TO ATTEMPT IDENTIFY  
ALL POSSIBLE OVERLAPS BETWEEN FLIGHTS ARRIVING FROM SOA/SEA CITIES  
AND  
THOSE DEPARTING FOR EUROPEAN DESTINATIONS. RAAJDATA READILY AVAILABLE FROM INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE GUIDE. HOWEVER, EMBASSY OFFERS FOLLOWING COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS TO SUPPORT OUR BELIEF THAT DUBAI RATHER THAN ABU DHABI MORE LIKELY SERVE AS COURIER EXCHANGE POINT FOR HEROIN

SMUGGLERS:

A. FREQUENCY OF DAILY ARRIVALS/DEPARTURES IS MUCH HIGHER AT DUBAI THAN AT ABU DHABI. MOREOVER THERE ARE FAR FEWER CONNECTING FLIGHTS OUT OF ABU DHABI (MANY EUROPEAN AIRLINE FLIGHTS ORIGINATE/TERMINATE AT ABU DHABI AND THEREFORE CARRY NO TRANSIT PASSENGERS). MANY FLIGHTS TO/ FROM EUROPEAN AND SEA STOPS TRANSIT DUBAI BETWEEN ABOUT 2200 HOURS AND 0200 HOURS LOCAL. CONSEQUENCE IS THAT AROUND MIDNIGHT MOST NIGHTS OF THE WEEK TRANSIT AREA AT DUBAI AIRPORT USUALLY CROWDED WITH HUNDREDS OF PASSENGERS FROM TWO OR MORE DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS. IN ADDITION. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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DUBAI IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES HAVE PRACTICE OF HOLDING IN TRANSIT ARE A LARGE NUMBERS OF CONTRACT WORKERS AND OTHER ARRIVALS FROM SOA COUNTRIES PENDING THEIR CLEARANCE FOR ENTRY INTO DUBAI. CROWDED CONDITIONS PREVALENT AT DUBAI IDEAL FOR SURREPTITIOUS TRANSFERS OF CONTRABAND COMPARED WITH ABU DHABI WHERE THERE ARE FEWER PASSENGERS IN TRANSIT AT ANY GIVEN TIME. MOREOVER, THERE IS LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT GIVEN AT ABU

DHABI FOR ONWARD PASSENGERS TO LEAVE AIRCRAFT FOR TRANSIT LOUNGE WHICH HAS FEW AMENITIES AND NO SHOPS. DUBAI ON OTHER HAND HAS NUMEROUS DUTY FREE SHOPS AND OTHER FACILITIES INTENDED TO DRAW PASSENGERS INTO TRANSIT AREA DURING STOP-OVERS. EXISTENCE OF THESE SHOPS, ETC. ALSO OPENS POSSIBILITIES FOR SMUGGLING RINGS TO ARRANGE WITH CONCESSION HOLDERS (OR THEIR INDIAN CLERKS) FOR TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF CONTRABAND SHOULD FLIGHT DELAYS OR CANCELLATIONS CAUSE COURIERS TO MISS EACH OTHER IN DUBAI.

B. SECURITY TENDS TO BE TIGHTER AT ABU DHABI THAN AT DUBAI AIRPORT. HOWEVER, NEITHER AIRPORT SUBJECTS TRANSIT PASSENGERS TO CUSTOMS SEARCH UPON ENTERING OR LEAVING TRANSIT AREAS. HAND-LUGGAGE IS CHECKED MORE OR LESS CAREFULLY FOR WEAPONS BUT NOT FOR DRUGS. NEITHER EMBASSY OR DUBAI NOR US CUSTOMS ADVISER TO ABU DHABI CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT AWARE OF ANY BREACHES OF INTEGRITY ON PART OF CUSTOMS INSPECTORS AT AIRPORT CUSTOMS IN EITHER DUBAI OR ABU DHABI. INTRONICALLY, SMUGGLERS' ABILITY TO CORRUPT ABU DHABI CUSTOMS OFFICIALS HANDICAPPED BY VERY ADMINISTRATIVE DEFICIENCIES WHICH MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO ASSURE CORRUPT OFFICERS WOULD BE ROUTINELY ON DUTY AT TIMES CONVENIENT TO SMUGGLERS. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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C. VISA RESTRICTIONS WERE TIGHTENED UP LAST OCTOBER WITH ELIMINATION OF FORMER 7-DAY TRANSIT VISAS WHICH WERE WIDELY ABUSED BY JOB-SEEKERS AND OTHERS WHO FAILED TO DEPART WITHIN AUTHORIZED PERIOD. HOWEVER, ENTRY REGULATIONS HAVE TENDED TO BE LESS STRINGENTLY ADHERED TO IN DUBAI AND SHARJAH THAN IN ABU DHABI. IN PART BECAUSE OF COMPLAINTS BY MERCHANTS AND HOTEL-KEEPERS IN NORTHERN EMIRATES, 7-DAY TRANSIT VISAS ISSUED UPON ARRIVAL AT AIRPORT WERE RESTORED MAY 31 BUT ISSUANCE RESTRICTED TO BUSINESSMEN, COMPANY OFFICIALS, AND ENGINEERS WHOSE ENTRY IS SPECIFICALLY SPONSORED BY LOCAL FIRM LICENSED TO OPERATE IN UAE. ALL OTHERS SEEKING ENTRY INTO UAE MUST HAVE VALID VISA ISSUED BY UAE CONSULAR OFFICER ABROAD. THOSE WITHOUT VISAS WILL BE COMPELLED TO REMAIN IN TRANSIT LOUNGES FOR DEPARTURE ABOARD FIRST AVAILABLE FLIGHT.

D. SOUTH ASIANS ARE FREQUENT AND REGULAR VISITORS TO UAE AND MAKE UP ONE-QUARTER TO ONE-THIRD OF TOTAL POPULATION. SOUTH ASIANS ARE USUALLY SUBJECT TO THOROUGH CUSTOMS SEARCH UPON ARRIVAL IN BOTH ABU DHABI AND DUBAI. AS DEA AWARE, DUBAI AIRPORT POLICE RECENTLY FOUND FOUR KILOS OF HASHISH SEPEETED IN FALSE BOTTOM OF SUITCASE BELONGING TO ARRIVING PAKISTANI WORKER. SOUTHEAST ASIANS AND OVERSEAS CHINESE ARE LESS FREQUENT VISITORS TO EMIRATES BUT PERHAPS FOR THIS REASON ARE LESS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER CLOSE SCRUTINY FROM CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND POLICE, ESPECIALLY IF THEY APPEAR TO BE MIDDLE-CLASS BUSINESSMEN AND REMAIN IN TRANSIT AREAS OF AIRPORTS. IN SAME VEIN, EUROPEANS ARE UAUALLY SCRUTINIZED LESS CLOSELY THAN NON-EUROPEANS.

4. CONCLUSION: EMBASSY IS UNABLE TO STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT ABU DHABI AIRPORT IS NOT RPT NOT BEING USED AS COURIER TRANSFER POINT AS SUGGESTED DEA AMSTERDAM SOURCE. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THIS, HOWEVER

FOR VARIOUS REASONS CITED ABOVE, WE THINK DUBAI OR EVEN BAHRAIN MORE LOGICAL AND, FROM SMUGGLERS' POINT OF VIEW, MORE RELIABLE TRANSFER POINT THAN ABU DHABI.

DICKMAN

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DATA, DRUG CONTROL, PROGRAMS (PROJECTS)  
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**Draft Date:** 06 jun 1978  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
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**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
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**To:** THE HAGUE  
**Type:** TE  
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